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"For my part, I look forward with absolute confidence to the liberal support by the state of a 
school whose chief function is to add to the sum of human achievement." With these words, 
spoken on June 7, 1904, during his inaugural address at the University of Wisconsin, Charles 
R. VanHise summarized the mission of the state in supporting colleges and universities in 
America. State institutions of higher education were created to serve the residents of that 
state, offering a wide array of academic disciplines at one location, including ;a rts , sciences, 
and humanities, and providing interaction among the students of these diverse studies. They 
have a societal obligation to be a "watchtower" over the sons and daughters of the state, 
-
strengthening creative work and providing limitless opportunity for knowledge (8rubacher and 
Rudy 1968, 166-67). In a society previously dominated by private institutions charging high 
tuition, the creation and development of state-funded postsecondary educati()n has made 
"higher learning more functional and more closely related to the daily concerns of the average 
American ... " (8rubacher and Rudy 1968, 389-90). Their presence has contributed to the 
United States moving "from a system of higher education open to a very small proportion of 
the population and largely peripheral to the economic activities of the country to a system of 
higher education offering access to all high school graduates and functioning at the center of 
the nation's economic, social, and political life" (Levine 1993, xi). 
This alliance between the state and higher education necessitated a revised definition of the 
obligations of each party. "The most direct and tangible link between state government and 
--
higher education is usually the budget," (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 15) and accordingly this 
---. 
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relationship is also the most complex. Without financial support, any long-range planning is 
pointless, and many controls over institutions are directly or indirectly tied to financing (Hines 
1988,21). 
Budgeting is the process of making choices regarding how to divide a state's limited resources 
among competing interests, or explained another way, "translating financial resources into 
human purposes ... a mechanism for making choices among alternative expenditures" 
(Wildavsky 1992, 2). This "web of interactions" (Wildavsky 1992, 3) alludes to the struggles 
that arise from competing forces that each want to use the same monetary resources for 
different purposes. 
Indiana is not immune from such a struggle. The efforts of the seven state-supported 
universities to gain sufficient funding to sustain and further develop their objectives are 
deliberate and resolute. Their leaders and supporters believe they provide an incredible 
opportunity to the state of Indiana. Representative Jerry Bales (R-Bloomingt()n) states, "If 
we're ever going to become a great state, and we're a long way from it, we have to educate 
more of our citizens.,,1 
The purpose of this work is to examine the process of appropriating funds to public institutions 
of higher education in Indiana. This will be done by considering the purpose and structure of 
the university; the roles of the government relations director or university lobbyist and the 
Commission for Higher Education; and the legislative and gubernatorial input given to the 
budget. An additional area of inquiry is the relationships between and among these actors. 
1 This and. all 5ubseqii~iit references to COiliiiients by Repre~iitative Jerry Dales CGilie frOii'i a t1elephone inte."iew· 
on Decem1x:r G, 1995. 
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-The Public University-
Public higher education has come under great criticism over the past century as it has become 
more entrenched as an actor in the political process of state appropriations. Considering that 
fully 60 percent of its operating budget comes from government sources--mostly the state--it 
becomes an understandable focal point (Anderson 1992, 28). Only 15 percel1t comes from 
student tuition and fees; while this has been used to "improve services, enhal1ce quality, and 
maintain a competitive edge over other institutions," (Hines 1988,49) there has not always 
been this dependency upon public support. 
State influence within the realm of higher education began significantly beforE~ the popularly 
cited 1862 Morrill Act (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 145; Roche 1994, 28). Oril~inally introduced 
in 1857, this act, which became known as the Morrill Land Grant Act, created land-grant 
colleges concentrating on agriculture and commerce; before the act was passed were schools 
including Transylvania University in Kentucky (established 1780), University ()f Georgia (1789), 
and University of Vermont (1791). While none of these schools offered instruction of level 
commonly accepted as "university work," the notable fact was that these institutions had been 
essentially private in nature. While they had been established under government charter and 
oversight, their management had been granted to a corporate group (Brubacher and Rudy 
1968, 145). The year 1804 saw the first federal land grant for the establishment of a state-run 
university, following the state of Ohio's takeover of their university endowment, and by the time 
the Morrill Act was introduced in 1857, the national government had granted ()ver 4 million 
acres of land to fifteen states to establish new universities (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 154). 
--
Occurring simultaneously was a modification of how the public valued postseGondary 
education. More students wanted to further their education beyond the rudimentary skills 
taught in the schools; not merely in a wider variety of areas but also to higher levels. Thus an 
ever-larger percentage of the population would be seeking the chance at higher education 
(Brubacher and Rudy 1968,161). Public institutions, as an offering of the state, were being 
viewed as "service providers" geared to benefit the majority of the community, more so than 
the private institutions that had been available to date, and more adaptable to the changing 
needs of the maturing nation (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 156). After the Civil War, the 
expansion of state-supported offerings in higher education took on a feverish pace, as the 
value of an advanced degree in later life was more widely acknowledged (Henry 1975, 211). 
These expectations have taken the development of public higher education to an amazing 
prominence. 
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The modern higher education system is comprised of an assortment of institutions, varying in 
size, structure, academic focus, and fiscal autonomy. The Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching (hereafter Carnegie Foundation) classifies colleges and universities 
based on their level of degrees awarded, academic or research focus, and on any individual 
field specialization (Evangelhauf 1994, A 17). School size ranges from the traditionally small 
community colleges and two-year junior colleges to the larger branch campuses and often 
enormous main campuses of state universities. In direct relation to the size of the campus, the 
educational mission of the institution varies, as it is "the underlying value of most state systems 
of higher education. The flagship research university has a different role and mission from that 
of the regional colleges or the community college system" (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 17). 
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The Carnegie Foundation has designated Indiana University (Bloomington) and Purdue 
University (West Lafayette) as Research I; Ball State University (Muncie) as Doctoral I; Indiana 
State University (Terre Haute) as Doctoral II; University of Southern Indiana (Evansville) as 
Master's II; and Vincennes University and Ivy Tech State College as Associat'e of Arts Colleges 
(Evangelhauf 1994, A 17). Research I institutions offer a full range of degrees from the 
baccalaureate to the doctorate and award 50 or more doctoral degrees each year. In addition 
they place high priority on research and receive at least $40 million in annual federal support. 
Doctoral I universities are similar to Research I institutions, awarding at least 40 doctorates 
yearly in at least five disciplines. The difference is an emphasis on teaching over research and 
any federal support is minimal. Doctoral II institutions differ from Doctoral I universities only in 
the number of doctorates awarded annually: at least 10 in three or more disciplines or at least 
20 in one or more discipline. Master's II schools award 20 or more master's degrees annually 
in one or more disciplines and offer the same array of baccalaureate degrees. Associate of 
Arts colleges offer Associates of Arts certificates or degrees and rarely offer baccalaureate 
degrees. 
These classifications are important in explaining to the legislature the missions of each school, 
especially when grouping them with similar institutions across the nation, according to Indiana 
Commission for Higher Education Deputy Commissioner Kent Weldon.2 In addition, when a 
school is planning a mission change, these "shorthand" classifications are uSE~ful in 
demonstrating what facilities or programs are necessary to move from one mission category to 
another. 




With such a wide array of educational opportunities available, it is understandable how 
enrollments have multiplied by a factor of forty since the beginning of the 2otl1 century (Levine 
1993, xi). Unfortunately, the increase in students has resulted in an increase in operating 
expenses, and tuition has on the average increased at twice the rate of inflation (Hines 1988, 
49). College officials explain that tuition and fees are often not sufficient to cover the cost of 
providing quality education for students. Between 1940 and 1960, public university tuition 
doubled; even with this astronomical increase, the president of Oberlin College in Ohio 
estimated, in 1927, that it paid only half the cost of a student's college education (Brubacher 
and Rudy 1968, 377). However, there is still a notion that government is obligated to provide 
low cost higher education to the people. Maintenance of low tuition through public subsidy, 
though, has provided "reasonable assurance of accessibility and equality of collegiate 
opportunity, institutional autonomy, and substantial support for institutional programs" 
(Stampen 1980, 1). As a service that comes under direct scrutiny of the statE!, and, based 
upon the level of state funding, may be limited in access to the public, there has been a 
growing interest in taking a more active role in the appropriations process. 
The university often runs the risk of suffering in the budget process. Future funding is never 
certain from budget cycle to budget cycle, as "it is constantly being placed at the mercy of 
whatever political vicissitudes arise ... "(Kurtz 1978, 289). No behavior pattern is truly 
predictable, regardless of which party is in power, be it taxing or spending, adjusting for 
inflation, or any other aspect of budgeting. Each biennial budget process can be considerably 
different from previous or following sessions as the fiscal situation varies or the state's needs 
and values change. Since neither the president nor the chancellor can control the institution's 
future, given the fierce competition among representatives and proponents of special interests, 
campus leaders have recognized the need to step up direct representation of their situations to 
--
state government. Presidents and faculty, collectively referred to as educators by George 
Roche, former president of Hillsdale College in Michigan, have become more visible in state 
capital buildings. Roche asserts: 
Educator conjures up the image of someone dedicated to the life of the mind ... 
While many in academe still fit that description, more often than not the term 
now denotes a politically savvy power player. . . . Those who occupy these lofty 
positions ... do understand that maintenance of the current system re~quires a 
lot of money. Accordingly, many have become very polished professional 
panhandlers. (1994, 82-3) 
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Often, especially for large universities with a wide range of academic programs, huge faculty 
rosters, and even branch campuses, the burden of maintaining campus and personal 
obligations while trying to oversee the budget process is more than they can handle. Merely 
depending upon legislators to grant requested legislative appropriations to meet expenses has 
had many drawbacks in the past for state universities because "lay opinion in the legislature 
was often at odds with professional opinion in scrutinizing items in the university budget" 
(Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 376). This has resulted in the creation of a university lobby at the 
state capital, and even professional lobbyists for the university system. 
-University Lobbyists-
The university lobbyist has become more prevalent in state government as the demands of 
requesting institutional funding and other measures that affect higher education require 
constant observation of legislative and gubernatorial proceedings. Since campus leaders 
cannot be present at every session of the state legislature or take time to meE~t with influential 
leaders, the university lobbyist is sent to be a full-time representative. Often more 
diplomatically called a "government relations director," the university lobbyist oversees the 
-appropriations talks, learns the political terrain in each session, and uses whatever means 
necessary to advance the institutional cause before those involved in the decisions. Most 
institutions today have even created an office of full-time staff whose primary responsibilities 
focus on government relations (Roche 1994, 85). 
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University lobbyists have been given a negative image along with other "hired guns" for special 
interest groups. Seen as money-hungry, self-interested representatives of special interest 
groups, they are shunned, ignored, and generally avoided. The university lobbyist is often 
grouped right along with others, such as organized labor unions and utility providers. This is 
an interesting tendency, since higher education is still presented as not-for-profit and strictly 
student-focused. Nevertheless, university lobbyists are faced with such negative reception as 
a result of what has been identified as a "lack of integrity, that ... is the manifestation of the 
_ fallen nature of the universities. It is visible ... and it is seen by the government officials" 
(Goldwin 1978,216). Hayes E. Gahagen, a former Maine state senator, describes the 
lobbying process for higher education as "incredible ... incessant wining and dining and other 
forms of attention from well-placed administrators as well as trustees and alumni. , . [receiving] 
favor after favor" (Roche 1994, 83). In addition, Charles S. Lenth, director of the Education 
Commission of the States, claims that university representatives "don't define, the issues in 
clear enough ways" (Mercer 1994, A22). These statements promote the negative bias against 
university lobbyists. 
-
In response to these claims, though, Representative Bales believes that the university lobbyist 
is an important and effective tool in the appropriations process. He explains his perception of 
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their role as 
a messenger between the institution and the General Assembly. They serve as 
a sounding board, carrying the university's message to the legislature and then 
fielding the resulting questions .... University representatives in Indiana are very 
good at representing the full situation to the legislature and making thE~mselves 
available for explanations. They do a very good job at defining benefits of 
higher education at the institution and statewide. Their true motive is the benefit 
of the state. 
A fundamental difference that distinguishes university lobbyists from professional lobbyists in 
Indiana, as Representative Bales explains, is the professional lobbyist is a "hired gun" that 
often represents a variety of interests, none of which he or she is directly a part. The 
university lobbyist, however, is generally full-time staff for the institution, understands the 
campus from an inside perspective, and knows the minutia of university operations and 
infrastructure. Therefore, when the university lobbyist represents the requests before the 
legislature, there is greater sense of identity with the cause and a stronger sense of urgency 
as to why this should be granted, other than it is what the client wishes to occur. 
Dr. John Huie, former budget director for Governor Otis Bowen and current director of state 
relations for Purdue University, concurs with the role of the government representative for 
higher education. "One way to get people together is to feed them," he states. "The university 
has an obligation to the people and the state to plead its case before the legislators .... 
Tactics such as tickets to a university function bring them closer to the issue (the campus) than 
tickets to a pro ball game or some other non-related function.,,3 "If you choose to have a 




relatively decentralized structure [of higher educationt," states Kent Weldon, "with that will 
come a certain level of self-assertiveness, and with that will come individual means to advance 
their agendas." Mr. Weldon has not experienced a pervasive feeling of resentment from the 
legislature in regard to university lobbying methods in the past. 
One approach being utilized by university representatives to address the negative impressions 
is to expand beyond the individual lobbyist into a coalition with other groups within the 
community--allies that would have vested interest in a sustained, successful system of higher 
education, e.g., business, industry, and primary education (Hines 1988, 32). Even among the 
university lobbyists, there is a sense of urgency for a unified coalition. While E~ach school has 
its own lobbyist(s), Dr. Huie elaborates, there is a sense of common purpose and unity among 
the representatives regarding each school's requests. In Indiana, there is a sense of 
cooperation among the schools in serving the citizens by providing higher educational 
services, and this cooperation extends to the legislative process. 
-The State Higher Education Commission-
The apparent need for a strong presentation of worthiness and a beneficial image has, over 
the years, provided the rationale for an additional educational actor in the lobbying process. 
Section 1202 of the Education Amendments of 1972 to the Higher Education Act of 1965 
began federal funding for state higher education commissions, and by the late 1970s, all 
states except Wyoming, several territories, and the District of Columbia had statutory state-
level coordinating or governing boards for postsecondary education (Carnegie 1976b, 52; 
Hines and Hartmark 1980, 13; Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 27). Forty-three of these state 
boards have been given statutory power of review over institutional budgets and 
4 Clarification added. 
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recommendation power to the governor and/or legislature. This trend began at the end of the 
nineteenth century, as states which grew frustrated from unruly competitive institutions and the 
resulting factionalism. Efforts to overcome these trends included centralizing administrative 
efforts within state government (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 381). The Education Acts merely 
codified the practice. 
The role of the state higher education board is a volatile one, often coming under great fire: 
"When the campuses choose not to become involved, policy makers sometimes turn to state 
boards," Hines writes. "If the state boards do not become involved, lawmakers' continued 
support for higher education may become jeopardized; if they become too involved, however, 
campuses become critical of their intrusiveness" (1988, 1). 
Two types of boards exist in the states: coordinating and governing. The basic difference is 
that "[s]tatewide governing boards tend to be more concerned with issues of institutional 
management, whereas coordinating boards concern themselves with issues of higher 
education policy" (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 15). From the two types of boar(:fs, four structural 
models in the statewide system are identified; the first two involve governing boards, and the 
second two involve coordinating boards: 
• State-Agency Model -- Coordinating agency and legislature make all budget 
decisions for institutions and exercise strict financial control. 
• State-Controlled Model -- Coordinating agency is still primary authority for 
higher education but relies more upon institutional budget requests. 
• State-Aided Model -- Joint responsibility for institutional financing is shared by 
the state and the institution, while agency tends to be more of an advisor. 
--
• Free-Market Model -- Institution is financially responsible for itself, while 
agency is merely a provider of funds and the state contracts with the institution 
to provide educational services. (Layzell and Lyddon 1990,27) 
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The advantages and disadvantages of both governing boards and coordinating boards are 
each rather clear. Governing boards oversee actual campus governance, appointment of the 
president, and authority over management of the campus budget. Governing board members 
tend, however, to become more aligned with the campuses than with the state government of 
which they are members, and in turn alienate relations with the state. They a!lso are more 
inclined to exclude differing aspects of higher education, such as community colleges and 
private institutions. Coordinating boards, on the other hand, relate to many more aspects of 
postsecondary education, including the private sector. They also make statewide master plans 
into which each college falls without being very campus-specific, which affords greater 
institutional autonomy. They approve or refuse proposed degree programs and make 
appropriations recommendations to the legislature. In spite of these advanta!~es, 
disadvantages include greater influence by governors in institutional affairs, greater 
independent behavior by campus officials, especially the preSident, and potential for total 
disregard from the institution for the board's recommendations (Hines and Hartmark 1980, 2-
3). 
Hines and Hartmark reflect a definite preference for the coordinating board over the governing 
board based on these advantages. They explain that generally, U[c]oordinating agencies are 
seen as a buffer between the institution and the state and as a mediator bet~veen the needs of 
higher education and the demands of the state ... U (1980, 16). Further, this arrangement 
gives greater autonomy to each institution in determining individual operational policies and 
-13 
mission statements, while the coordinating board maintains the greater statewide perspective, 
still sensitive to individual institutional needs. Coordinating agencies are more likely to be run 
by people with either previous educational experience or a stronger sympathy toward it rather 
than popularly-elected officials. In turn the state is more likely to operate in kind, with a 
broader statewide focus toward these appropriations (Hines and Hartmark 1980, 15). 
The Carnegie Foundation expresses in its report The States and Higher Education: A Proud 
Past and a Vital Future the following concern about governing boards: 
We regret this [the overall tendency toward centralization of authority over 
higher education]5 because: 
• It reduces the influence of students and of faculty members and of campus 
administrators and of members of campus governing boards--all persons who 
know the most about institutions of higher education, and are the most directly 
involved in their operations. It also reduces their sense of responsibility. The 
governance of academic institutions should include an influential role for 
academics and for those in close relations with them. 
• This centralization seems to have had no measurable direct impacts on 
policies or on practices. No provable case can thus far be made that higher 
education is in any way better because of the centralization, except, where it 
has taken place, in the one area of careful advance academic planning for 
higher education as a whole. It is, of course, not possible to know, however, 
what would have happened in the absence of the centralization that did occur. 
• The governance processes are worse. They are more costly, more 
cumbersome, more time-consuming, more frustrating, and place more power 
5 Clarification added 
in the hands of those who are the furthest removed and who know the least. 
(1976a, 11) 
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The Carnegie Foundation summarizes its stance that what is needed is "good information, 
careful analysis of it, and thoughtful judgments about policy so that those with final authority, in 
any event, for most, and perhaps even all, major actions lies with governors and legislators, 
with [institutions] and with students. In between regulatory mechanisms cannot long exercise 
authority of importance strictly on their own" (1976a, 13). 
The Indiana Commission for Higher Education, created in 1971 as an oversight board in the 
style of the state-aided model, serves to advise state institutions in the budget process and be 
an advocate for new degree programs. Deputy Commissioner Weldon elaborates that 
"statutory wording gives it an advisory position ... coordinating universities but advising the 
legislature and governor." He further explains that if Indiana were compared to the rest of 
commissions in the nation, the Commission would be almost entirely at the end of the 
spectrum that emphasizes the university's individual role and the decentralization of the 
process. Each institution is encouraged to pursue individual efforts in addition to the 
Commission's efforts. Bales states, "The commission was created to be an advocate of higher 
education and serve as an oversight mechanism to prevent duplication of professional 
education programs such as law, medicine, dentistry, etc., ... while still affording each 
institution as much autonomy as possible." The preference for coordinating boards is shared 
by Representative Bales and Dr. Huie. Dr. Huie explains, "We should always strive to make 
decisions at the lowest point in the hierarchy because they have the most information that 




Bales warns that the Commission was overstepping its boundaries in the mid··80s, as it began 
to "micromanage the schools--dictating missions and programs rather than permitting 
institutional autonomy." He is hopeful that new leadership within the Commission will bring it 
back into what he believes is its appropriate focus. 
-The Legislature-
From the earliest days of state support for institutions, an ongoing struggle for guaranteed 
funding has been waged by schools and legislatures. From the days of the first land grant 
colleges in the early 1800s, "regular and substantial tax support was necessary and ... proved 
difficult to convince the American public of the wisdom of this policy" (Brubacher and Rudy 
1968, 155). Many states, like Georgia, merely "endowed" their universities and left them to 
fend for themselves except for an occasional lottery endeavor or a rare appropriation 
(Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 146). 
Indiana's earliest dealings with higher education were rather unstable as well. Vincennes 
University, the original land grant college in the state, was commandeered by a religious sect 
interested in establishing its own school. Indiana University was later overrun by the same 
group. Eventually, in 1828, the General Assembly established the Bloomington seminary and 
decreed that "no sectarian beliefs were ever to be taught therein" (Brubacher and Rudy 1968, 
155). Even Article 8 of the Indiana Constitution, which establishes the public school system in 
Indiana, does not mention higher education of any form, especially not the state university 
(Henn 1993, 137). 
Key factors that determine what portion of the budget will go to higher education as opposed 




of governors and legislators with higher education; the dominant values of a state's political 
leaders; and the place of higher education in the state's political culture (Berdahl 1978, 351; 
Hines 1988,4; Hines and Hartmark 1980,21; Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 20). In order to 
gather a general perception about a state's emphasis on higher education, it is important to 
examine "[p]atterns of public spending for education (that is, resources allocated among 
competing preferences) ... For example, states with historically strong private sectors of 
higher education tend to spend less over time on public higher education relative to public 
education for kindergarten through grade 12" (Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 25). 
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Considering "higher education has become the largest discretionary item in the budget" 
(Layzell and Lyddon 1990, 31), state legislatures have been compelled to playa greater role in 
determining institutional spending. Since court decisions or federal statutes prescribe certain 
spending levels for items such as Medicare or prisons in the state budget, the! discretionary 
areas, where the lawmakers and the state budget director can negotiate about dividing 
remaining funds, are left contending for larger portions of steadily decreasing revenues (Lively 
1992, A22). Roche confirms this trend, as he notes that "[s]tates were spending a quarter of 
their budgets on higher education two decades ago; now, on average, they are spending 18 
percent or less" (1994, 13). The Carnegie Foundation reports the effects this level of state 
spending has on the state taxpayer: "the burden, per student, has risen ... by more than three 
times over and even more than that for the taxpayer at the federal level" (1976a, 30). 
Legislators need to justify where the money they allocate will be going and that it is a valid 
expenditure, since they will be held responsible for their decisions during the "following election. 
During the appropriations process, lawmakers evaluate diversity of missions among senior 
colleges, duplication of programs at many schools, accessibility to higher education for 
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"educationally underserved areas," and other unmet needs in the state's postsecondary 
offerings (Hines 1988, 1). Part of this call for legislative accountability appeared in a task force 
report from the 1986 National Governors' Association calling on states "to define institutional 
missions clearly, emphasize the importance of undergraduate education, ... , provide 
incentives for the improvement of quality, and emphasize the importance of commitment to 
access" (Callan 1993, 5)6 
Often, the need to defend appropriations causes legislators to become overspecific in line-item 
allocation and dictate to institutions how to and how not to spend given moniE!s (Roche 1994, 
94). This stems from the Depression era, where state officers began to take stronger control 
over institutional budgets to control rising costs and eliminating waste and duplication among 
the schools (Henry 1975,212). This tendency to be overcritical can result in what is often 
negatively termed a "gadfly" legislator, who seems intent on "micromanaging" higher 
education. Instead, says Pennsylvania State Representative Ronald R. Cowell, legislators 
"have a significant obligation to taxpayers and ... desire to be ever more effective advocates" 
(Mercer 1994, A22). With more information on what the institutions are doing, they can insure 
that they are making a good investment. 
The term "gadfly" is seen by many in Indiana as an undeserved negative label. Kent Weldon 
comments, "I see a gadfly as something pesky and insignificant ... [these legislators] being 
called gadflies are actually executing their duties in a thoughtful and responsible fashion." 
Often, explains Dr. Huie, these legislators are in difficult situations, such as trying to balance 
budgets with limited funds and many deserving requests. They are not singly critical of higher 
6 National Governors' Association, Time fOf Results, Wasl"J.ngton D.C.: NGA, 1986. 
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education but often extend that same criticism to other public services and private interests 
that make requests, simply as a means of making the most judicious decisions possible. 
-The Governor-
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A political role that has been gaining greater influence in the budgetary decisionmaking for 
higher education is the state governor. Hines and Hartmark explain that as the "pattern of 
conflict in most states gravitates to disputes over total appropriation for higher education rather 
than more marginal issues of inter-institutional allocations, the principal conflict will be between 
the governor and state budget office versus the university system, regardless of the structure 
of governance or coordination" (1980, 16). In the mid-1970s, the Carnegie Foundation noted, 
"The governor, in many states, is now the one dominant figure in higher 
education ... and suggest, as a check and balance, that governing boards be 
structured so that, first of all, governors not be members of them, and second, 
that appointments to these boards be recommended through appropriate 
screening mechanisms [such as selection committees fashioned by the 
governor and charged with specific areas to evaluate] and be subject to some 
form of legislative approval" (1976a, 19)7. 
Hines notes that areas of greater gubernatorial involvement include access and quality, system 
consolidation, relations between private and public campuses, as well as how improved higher 
education opportunities might help improve economic conditions, particularly involving 
technology, industry, and job training (1988, 22). 
Governors also, as Hines points out, tend to be results-oriented (1988, 77). As an advocate of 
economic development and job creation within the state, the governor can serve as a link 
7 Clarification added. 
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between the legislature, whose job it is to make choices about how to allocate limited 
resources within the political process, and the education community that is battling countless 
other interests. However, as revealed in a 1986 survey, "governors listen to their own staff 
aides, the Education Commission of the States, and the National Governors' Association more 
than they do to campus presidents an to state and federal higher education associations" 
(Hines 1988, 35-36)8 This only further supports the idea of expanded coalitions and continued 
efforts to attempt fresh approaches beyond the traditional styles of government relations. 
A technique that is employed by current Indiana governor Evan Bayh is the use of a legislative 
liaison from the governor's office. Much like a university representative, the liaison represents 
the governor's interests on policy to the legislature. During the 1995 legislative session in 
Indiana, Stan Jones served as the liaison, attending committee meetings, testifying on issues 
related to higher education and expressing the governor's interests on such. Dr. Huie defined 
the liaison's role as "a communication link with the legislature--articulating eXE!cutive goals, 
attending committee meetings, taking part in formulating policy strategies in the legislature. If 
he takes too active a role, he is accused of interfering, while too detached a role would cause 
similar criticism." 
The role of the legislative liaison is an important tool for the governor, as he needs to keep 
abreast of current issues and how they will affect not only the state, but his performance. The 
liaison is able to report back regarding people who testify before committee, concerns brought 
up for and against legislation, and the likelihood of a bill passing that he would need either to 
sign or veto. For the Indiana governor, this is especially important, since the governor has a 
8 Gilley, 1. Wade and Kenneth A. Fulmer. 1986. "A Question of Leadership, or To \Vhom Are Governors 
Listening?" Paper prepared for the Center for Policy Studies in Education, George ivlason University, Fairfax, 
Virginia. ED 282489. 
-. 
weak veto power, able to be overridden by a simple majority vote in the General Assembly. 
Representative Bales notes the "curious" nature of this role, since "in six years as governor, 
Bayh had never mentioned the words 'higher education' in a State of the State speech." 
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Another area in which the governor can exert influence over the university system rests with 
the power of appointments. The Indiana Code gives the governor the power to appoint the 
majority of the trustees on each state institution's board of trustees, as well as number of the 
members of the Indiana Commission for Higher Education. In addition, the governor has 
approval power for the student, faculty, and alumni representatives that are appointed by their 
respective constituencies to the boards and the Commission (Henn 1993, 29-·30). This power 
of appointment and review gives control over the composition of boards that will be shaping 
university policy and missions, selecting university presidents and other administrators, and 
establishing institutional goals. Similarly, appointment power of the Commission influences 
whom the members will eventually hire as commissioner, what sort of guidance is given to the 
institutions, and the direction for higher education in Indiana. 
Overall, the governor's role in the budget process is mostly an interested observer, watching 
the actions taken by the legislature and in the end approving or rejecting their decisions based 
on how he believes the state's residents will respond to such decisions (and if his chances of 
re-election will be helped). Most of the actual budgetary process is carried OUit by the budget 
director, who presents the official proposal to the legislature based upon submitted requests 
during the months before a budget session, and by his legislative liaisons who represent what 




In reviewing the roles of each actor in the budgetary process of allocating funds for higher 
education, it is apparent that each player has a very distinct role. The institution serves as a 
provider of education for those wishing to pursue postsecondary education. In that capacity, it 
is important to present and defend missions, programs, and future goals. The lobbyist serves 
to be a constant resource for those outside the institution and as a figurehead for the 
institution. The commission is charged with oversight and coordination amon'9 the varied 
institutions within the state as well as providing explanation and guidance to the legislature and 
the governor. The legislature is responsible for appropriating resources in thE~ best possible 
way to serve the residents of the state, involved with or apart from higher education. Finally, 
the governor is seen as the state's executive officer, providing both leadership and 
administrative accountability. 
Even with the distinct roles being conducted by each actor in the process, there is a great deal 
of cooperation built into the process. The institution provides the commission with the 
budgetary request, which the commission then presents to the budget director and the 
governor for consideration and approval by the legislature. While each branch has distinct 
concerns, direction, and motivation, there is an inherent need to abide by one another's needs 
and obligations in order to permit greater cooperation and progress. 
The process in Indiana is clearly effective and well structured to the political climate within the 
state. Each institution prides itself in offering a slightly different atmosphere, selection of 
academic specialties, and student body and faculty composition that would sE~rve the needs of 
the wide array of students within the state. Schools range from large main campuses with 
branch campuses around the state to mid-sized schools located somewhat centrally within a 
--
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region of the state to schools with small campuses serving more rural populations that 
otherwise may find it difficult to relocate to urban areas. They are accessible to the recent high 
school graduate, the returning advanced student, or the adult returning for a degree after 
years in the workplace or raising a family. Indiana prides itself in academic quality offered to 
any person wishing to partake. The legislators of the General Assembly are in general very 
supportive of the current structure and are critical only to the degree that they expect a high 
level of accountability from higher education's leaders regarding educational integrity and a 
high rate of return for the amount of money that is being invested in these facilities and 
students. 
As Representative Bales commented, "If we're ever going to become a great state, and we're 
a long way from it, we have to educate more of our citizens." Not only is Indiana well on its 
way to educate more of its citizens based upon current trends in higher education structure 
and spending, it is well on its way to producing a more capable, competitive, and productive 
class of graduates that will contribute to the development of Indiana's future. 
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Purpose of Thesis 
The concept of "lobbying" for a cause or special interest has long been seen as a selfish, dirt~ 
practice that is the subject of scorn and criticism. However, providers of many services 
traditionally provided by the state are finding themselves in the position of having to defend 
their existence and importance to the state in order to secure funding to maintain operations. 
Among these are the public institutions of higher learning in Indiana. 
This analysis of the players and their roles in the process of requesting and allocating state 
funding for higher education stems from my experience as a legislative lobbying intern for Ball 
State University during the 1995 budget session of the Indiana Legislature. It examines the 
functions of the university lobbyist, the legislature and governor, and the govE~rning and/or 
coordinating boards in the middle. 
